Many months ago, we here at Abnormal Use , 605 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 2010) [PDF], which involved a plaintiff allegedly injured when a cylinder on a bucket truck owned by Georgia Power failed. The plaintiff sued not only the manufacturer of the truck but that of the lift cylinder, as well. The problem for the plaintiff, however, was the statute of repose, which limited the action to “ten years from the date of the first sale or use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury.” If that seems unclear to you, well, the Eleventh Circuit wasn’t so sure about what it all meant, either. So, they certified the following question to the Georgia Supreme Court: Does the ten-year statute of repose begin to run when:
(1) a component part causing an injury is assembled or tested, (2) a finished product, which includes an injuring component part, is assembled, or, (3) a finished product, which includes an injuring component part is delivered to its initial purchaser?
In crafting OCGA § 51-1-11(b), the General Assembly did not choose to begin the period of repose “on the date of the ‘first sale’ of a product by its manufacturer. [Rather, OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2) ] provides that the period of repose commences on the date of the ‘first sale for use or consumption.’ The General Assembly could have chosen to begin the period of repose on the date that the product was last in the hands of the manufacturer, but it did not. The choice of “the date of the first sale for use or consumption” to trigger the running of the statute of repose is in keeping with OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(1)’s imposition of liability on a manufacturer who sells its product “directly or through a dealer or any other person” as new; regardless of any chain of middlemen, the end sale of the product as new is what brings the manufacturer within the ambit of OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(1), if the other conditions for imposing liability exist.
This ruling means that a manufacturer of a defective component part will not be able to avoid liability to an injured plaintiff when the end-product simply sits on the retailer’s shelf for a long time before being sold to the user, effectively shortening the statute of repose. The decision does not undermine a plaintiff’s burden to prove that the product is actually defective, or that the allegedly defective product proximately caused his or her injuries; it simply closes the procedural loophole that Johnson created.